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1. INTRODUCTION
The wealth of nations rests on the pillars of Labor, Capital,
Natural Resources,' and more recently, Intellectual Property.
2
However, intellectual property, at least in the form of patents, has
evolved in and is primarily the province of developed, industrial-
ized countries.3 In the last two decades, in order to protect taxpay-
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1 See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 1-60 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1981) (1775).
2 See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, National Obligations Under Intellectual Prop-
erty Treaties: The Beginning of a True International Regime, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 591, 591
(2000) ("Adam Smith taught us that the wealth of any nation rested on three pil-
lars: Labor, Capital and Natural Resources. Our generation has added a fourth
pillar- Intellectual Property in all of its forms."); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Ralph
Oman, The World Intellectual Property Organization: A United Nations Success Story,
79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 691, 692 (1997) (discussing intellectual prop-
erty and the World Intellectual Property Organization).
3 The nature of intellectual property is in some ways distinct from that of
tangible property. Only one or a few people can use tangible property at a single
time. The location of tangible property is typically determinable and the owner
maintains the right to exclude others from using the property. Because of this, the
owner can exploit the property as he sees fit to maximize his profitability. Intel-
lectual property is not subject to the same physical limitations. Intellectual prop-
erty can be used in a non-rivalrous manner, by large numbers of individuals si-
multaneously. Once intellectual property is made available, in the absence of
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ers and strong knowledge-based domestic industries,4 developed
countries, particularly the United States, have strongly encouraged
the rest of the world to adopt substantive affirmative standards of
intellectual property protection. The U.S. effort began in earnest
with the passage of Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitive Act of 1988 (the "Act").5 The Act requires that the U.S.
Trade Representative annually review the intellectual property re-
gimes of the United States' trading partners6 and place countries
whose regimes are below acceptable standards on a priority watch
list. Inclusion on the watch list typically results in bilateral discus-
sions between the United States and the offending country. Failure
to achieve resolution through bilateral discussions can result, for
grievous violators of U.S. intellectual property rights ("IPRs"), in
unilateral sanctions against the offending nation.7 This strategy
has been particularly effective when used against countries that
rely heavily on exports to the United States.8
Perhaps because bilateral methods of encouraging change in
the intellectual property policies of U.S. trading partners were inef-
ficient,9 U.S. business people and government representatives be-
gan calling for the creation of a new international intellectual prop-
substantive affirmative law stating otherwise, the owner is essentially dispos-
sessed of the right to exclude, and often, of any profits. Since resources involved
ex ante in the creation of intellectual property are often very high, the incentive
for the creation and disclosure of new ideas requires that the creator be able to re-
cover the initial investment of time and money, as well as some profit. Absent
protection, the creation of intellectual property, a widely recognized public good,
would be retarded.
4 In the case of the U.S. biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, much
of the research resulting in the creation of new products stands on the shoulders
of basic research financed by the taxpayer through the National Institutes of
Health and performed at domestic universities and hospitals.
5 See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-2420 (1999) (authorizing the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive to act to eliminate counter-policies deemed harmful to trade).
6 See Inti Linkletter Knapp, Comment, The Software Piracy Battle in Latin Amer-
ica: Should the United States Pursue its Aggressive Bilateral Trade Policy Despite the
Multilateral TRIPS Enforcement Framework?, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 173, 174
(2000) (discussing U.S. involvement in combating software piracy in Latin Amer-
ica).
7 See BENEDICTE CALLAN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, PIRATES ON THE
HIGH SEAS: THE UNITED STATES AND GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 11-12
(1998) (discussing the positive effects of U.S. pressure on nations who fail to pro-
tect IPRs).
8 See id. at 12 (noting that countries that rely on exports to the United States
are vulnerable to unilateral sanctions).




erty law.10 Predictably, developing countries wanted little part of
this, suggesting that promulgation of effective international intel-
lectual property standards through the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") would not be forthcoming." To overcome
this resistance, negotiators from developed countries engaged the
issue of international intellectual property standards at the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") Uruguay Round that
opened in 1986.12 Negotiating the issue in the GATT forum al-
lowed participants to engage in linkage bargaining.13 The linking
of international intellectual property standards to trade,
14 com-
bined with U.S. economic pressure, 5 resulted, in 1994, in the pas-
10 See id. at 8-15 (highlighting the competing needs of these countries calling
for new international intellectual property law). See also Michael P. Ryan, The
Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 535, 536-37 (1998) (noting the desire of U.S.
business people for the establishment of international intellectual property law).
11 WIPO administered the Paris Convention and at the time was viewed as
the most likely forum for international intellectual property law negotiations.
Developing countries preferred the WIPO forum because it provided one-nation,
one-vote decision-making. Since more than half of the members were considered
developing countries, and developing countries typically viewed strong intellec-
tual property policies as contrary to their interests, it appeared unlikely substan-
tive affirmative changes in international intellectual property law could be
achieved in WIPO. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 541; C. O'Neal Taylor, Linkage and
Rule-Making: Observations on Trade and Investment, and Trade and Labor, 19 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 639, 668 (1998).
12 See CALLAN, supra note 7, at 16 (emphasizing the opportunity presented by
the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations to establish international intellectual
property standards).
13 Linkage-bargain diplomacy is a theory of trade negotiations that suggests
the key to reaching an agreement is getting the correct mix of issues into negotia-
tions. In other words, issues previously unrelated may be "linked" for the pur-
poses of bargaining. In the GATT Uruguay Round, international intellectual
property standards were linked to trade concessions, a linkage that would have
been unlikely in a WIPO negotiation, since WIPO does not deal with broad as-
pects of trade, but with intellectual property alone. See, e.g., Mossinghoff, supra
note 2, at 598 (discussing how the Uruguay Round negotiations allowed for "crea-
tive bargaining" that allowed an agreement linking trade and intellectual prop-
erty, although there was no precedent); Ryan, supra note 10, at 541 (reviewing the
change from function-specific to linkage-bargain rulemaking); Taylor, supra note
11, at 668 (noting the differences in objectives between developing and developed
countries).
14 See, e.g., Mossinghoff, supra note 2, at 598 (noting that the GATT negotia-
tions included textiles, apparel, agriculture, services, foreign direct investment,
and government procurement and that developing countries had much to gain
from liberalized trade in textiles apparel and agricultural products).
15 See Ryan, supra note 10, at 542 ("USTR pursued an aggressive Special 301
diplomacy throughout the eight years of the Uruguay Round to keep countries at
the table.").
11352004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
sage of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agree-
ment ("TRIPS" or "TRIPS Agreement" or the "Agreement").16
The TRIPS Agreement 17 is an attempt to harmonize national
standards for intellectual property protection into an international
norm based primarily on the one currently used by developed
countries. TRIPS requires compliance with the substantive provi-
sions of existing international intellectual property treaties, 18 speci-
fies categories of intellectual property that are subject to interna-
tional standards,19 and mandates both national treatment 20 and
most favored nation treatment.21 TRIPS also includes a dispute
resolution mechanism2 2 that includes compulsory third-party arbi-
tration, final rulings, and enforcement procedures. 23 Since TRIPS
calls for the adoption of substantive affirmative law, it contains
"transitional arrangements"2 4 that establish finite periods of time
16 See, e.g., Mossinghoff, supra note 2, at 598-99 (discussing the events that led
to the passage of TRIPS); Ryan, supra note 10, at 537 (indicating that both function-
specific and linkage-bargain lawmaking continue in the post-TRIPS Agreement
era); Taylor, supra note 11, at 667-69 (examining the history of the TRIPS Agree-
ment); Knapp, supra note 6, at 189-90 (describing the passage of the TRIPS Agree-
ment).
17 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
18 See e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1; J.H. Reichman, From Free
Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 11, 15 n.10 (1997) (addressing the requirements of the TRIPS
Agreement); J. H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345,
347-51 (1995) [hereinafter Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards] (discussing the
TRIPS mandate).
19 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, part I, arts. 3, 4, part II §§ 1-7; Reich-
man, Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 18, at 348 ("These include (1) copy-
rights and related rights; (2) trademarks and (3) geographical indications; (4) in-
dustrial designs; (5) patents; (6) integrated circuit designs and (7) trade secrets or
confidential information.").
20 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3.
21 Id. art. 4.
22 Id. arts. 63, 64.
23 See Mossinghoff, supra note 2, at 596 (explaining history behind why TRIPS
requries "compulsory third-party arbitration, final rulings and enforcement pro-
cedures"). See generally Tuan N. Samahon, Note, Trips Copyright Dispute Settlement
after the Transition and Moratorium: Nonviolation and Situation Complaints Against
Developing Countries, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1051 (2000) (focusing on copy-
rights, this article discusses anticipated issues that hypothetically surround dis-
pute resolution).




for developed, 25 developing,26 and least developed countries
("LDCs")27 to ratify and enact TRIPS requirements.
This Comment will discuss international intellectual property
standards in the context of the Life Sciences industry.
28 It will
show how developing countries can intelligently implement TRIPS
and use internal administrative and judicial policy to set the bar for
patentability at a level that will maximize economic benefits under
the Agreement. Therefore, rather than evaluating the effectiveness
or non-effectiveness of TRIPS provisions that allow the exclusion of
Life Sciences (and other) subject matter from protection,29 this
Comment argues that it may be a much more effective strategy for
certain developing nations to embrace international intellectual
property standards for such subject matter. By implementing and
enforcing substantive intellectual property standards, developing
countries faithfully adhere to TRIPS. Intelligently implementing
TRIPS, by cooperatively using internal administrative and judicial
policy to set the bar for patentability higher than it presently is in
developed countries, will allow certain developing countries a
comparative competitive advantage in the Life Sciences industry.
In certain developing countries, the result may be the creation of a
superior research and development ("R&D") climate culminating
in a shift in R&D investment from developed to developing coun-
tries.
The Comment will provide background, in Section 2, on what
makes intellectual property, particularly patents, of critical impor-
tance to Life Sciences industries. Section 3 will examine the conse-
quences to developed countries, developing countries, and LDCs
of protecting Life Sciences intellectual property with substantive
international standards. Section 4 will examine the standards
promulgated by the TRIPS Agreement. Realizing that the TRIPS
Agreement provides significant loopholes for developing countries
to exclude Life Sciences products and processes from protection,
Section 5 will examine how developing countries might utilize
administrative and judicial policy in cooperation with intelligent
TRIPS implementation to gain an advantage over developed coun-
25 Id. art. 65 (1 year).
26 See id. (5 years).
27 Id. art. 66 (10 years).
28 In this Comment, the Author uses "Life Sciences" to describe both the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.
29 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 27, 30, 31.
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tries. Section 6 of the Comment will conclude that as developed
countries attempt to harmonize international intellectual property
standards, they should be wary of requiring too little. The result
will be not only a surrender of the moral high ground in interna-
tional intellectual property disputes, but very possibly, a signifi-
cant negative economic effect in the Life Sciences industry. This
negative economic effect includes a loss of R&D investment and
jobs, as well as a surrender of technical leadership in an industry
previously dominated by developed countries' concerns.
2. LIFE SCIENCES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The role of patents30 in creating new products in Life Sciences
industries is of critical importance.3 1 One reason for this is an un-
paralleled up-front R&D commitment.32 The result of this massive
up-front commitment is that typical drug innovation in the United
States costs domestic companies between three hundred and five
hundred million dollars. 33 The process typically requires over a
decade of research, testing, and Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approval before marketability. 34 Since the cost of copying
new compounds is typically dramatically less than their original
creation, 35 it appears contrary to investors' interests to invest
money in new drug discovery and development if foreign competi-
30 Patents are open letters from sovereign authority that grant a property
right. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1125 (6thed. 1990).
31 See, e.g., Robin Beck Skarstad, Comment, The European Union's Self-
Defeating Policy: Patent Harmonization and the Ban on Human Cloning, 20 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 353 (1999) (providing a good account of the European Union's fail-
ure to rationally apply patent law to achieve a competitive stance in the biotech-
nology industry).
32 See Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 29
N.Y.U. J. INTL' L. & POL'Y 95, 95 (1997) ("In 1996, U.S. research-based pharmaceu-
tical companies [spent] $16 billion on pharmaceutical R&D, representing nineteen
percent of sales-a ratio higher than any other sector... and five times the U.S. in-
dustry average of less than four percent.").
33 See id. at 95 (emphasizing the cost of drug innovation).
34 See id. (noting the lengthy process required in order to gain FDA approval).
It is also interesting to note the rigors of invention, by analogy to technology
transfer from universities to industry. See, e.g., Peter D. Blumberg, Comment,
From "Publish or Perish" to "Profit or Perish": Revenues from University Technology
Transfer and the § 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 89, 97 (1996) (citing
the one in ten rule: "of ten laboratory inventions, only one will receive a patent;
only one in ten patents will be licensed by a company, and only one in ten licenses
results in more than $25,000 per year in income").
35 See CALLAN, supra note 7, at 29 (noting the low cost of copying); Bale, supra




tors are allowed to make, use, and sell identical products for less
than the company that exhausted vast R&D expenditures. 6 Since
industry is responsible for most drug discoveries and also for de-
veloping, clearing administrative hurdles, and marketing new
drugs, 37 it is reasonable to conclude that there will be fewer new
drugs absent substantive intellectual property protection. Indeed,
Professor Edwin Mansfield concluded that in the pharmaceutical
industry, absent patent protection, sixty-five percent of the prod-
ucts introduced would not have been introduced.
38
3. CONSEQUENCES TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, AND LDCS OF PROTECTING LIFE SCIENCES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CONFLICTS
Globalization of economies, combined with a significant polar-
ity in the technical capabilities between LDCs, developing coun-
tries, and developed countries, has brought to light a tension be-
tween encouraging progress by granting IPRs to deserving
inventive enterprises and the resulting restrictions that granting
IPRs has on making, using, and selling protected goods in develop-
ing countries and LDCs.
Under the TRIPS Agreement, the owner of a patent has the
right to exclude others from making, using, and selling the inven-
tion.39 The owner also typically retains the right to license others to
make, use, and sell the invention.40 The "winner-take-all" 41 men-
36 The high price of patented products derived from the Biotechnology indus-
try is often justified. The investment to be recouped comes not only from the
R&D surrounding the patented product, but also from the many failed attempts at
inventing/discovering a new product. See Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999
Review of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement: Diverging views of Developed and Devel-
oping Countries Toward the Patentability of Biotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 48
(1998) ("[O]nly one in five thousand pharmaceutical compounds ever reaches the
commercial market.").
37 See id. at 64-65 (discussing the effects of inadequate intellectual property
protection on free trade).
38 Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: an Empirical Study, 32
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 173, 175 (1986) (noting that, of the industries studied, the
next closest in importance of patents was the chemical industry, where thirty per-
cent of products would not have been introduced -a testament to the significant
importance of patents in the pharmaceutical industry).
39 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 28 (explaining owners' right to
prevent others from "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" pat-
ented products or methods).
40 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the characteris-
tics of patent ownership).
41 See Skarstad, supra note 31, at 359.
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tality underlying the patent grant provides the patentee with what
is, in essence, a time-limited monopoly through which the grantee
may recoup investment dollars by cooperatively restricting compe-
tition and regulating the price of protected goods.
3.1. Developed Countries
The consequences to developed countries, the present home of
R&D investment and strong intellectual property protection, of low
or negligible international levels of protection, are the loss of prof-
its and an added economic burden42 on taxpayers, investors, and
patients in developed countries.43 Lower levels of protection are
believed to result in less innovative activity because fewer indi-
viduals or groups will take on the risk of developing novel ideas.44
Higher levels of protection are traditionally believed to have
the effect of increasing profitability as well as maximizing the crea-
tion of new drugs.45 However, patent laws can overprotect. When
patent laws overprotect a particular technology, they make it too
easy to obtain a patent and remove too much important informa-
tion from the public domain. When this happens, innovation can-
not go forward because investors cannot be reasonably certain that
innovations resulting from their investments will not infringe the
patents of another. For developed nations, the major task regard-
ing the granting of patent rights is to set a level of protection high
enough to encourage innovation, and the public good that accom-
panies it, without making it too easy to obtain a patent, thus over-
protecting and interfering with innovation.
42 Eduardo Buscaglia, Can Intellectual Property in Latin America Be Protected?,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS 96, 104 (Clarisa Long ed.,
2000) (estimating U.S. pharmaceutical losses due to infringement and counterfeit-
ing in Latin America in 1995 at $1,686,000,000).
43 This results because taxpayers, investors, and patients in developed coun-
tries are supporting the cost of R&D for much of the rest of the world.
44 FRANK P. PORCELLI & JOHN A. DRAGSETH, PATENTS: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 10 (forthcoming) (on file with author) ("Modem technologies, such as
pharmaceuticals ... require enormous up-front costs .... [W]ithout some sort of
protection, it is unlikely anyone would take the risk of developing breakthrough
ideas."); Bale, supra note 32, at 98 ("On a global plane, there is very little debate to-
day about whether there should be strong intellectual property protection for
pharmaceutical products.").





The consequence to developing countries, some of which are
home to very sophisticated Life Sciences infrastructures, 46 of low or
negligible international intellectual property protection, is the abil-
ity to pirate, inexpensively, 47 new Life Sciences products created by
developed countries. The lack of an R&D outlay allows industry in
developing countries to make drugs at a fraction of the cost re-
quired in developed countries.48 Low levels of international pro-
tection permit Life Sciences companies operating in developing
countries to sell their products in third countries at cheaper rates
than manufacturers from developed countries. While this is very
profitable for companies in developing countries, 49 the ability of pi-
rates in developing countries to reach third countries enhances the
economic insult to taxpayers, patients, and investors in developed
countries.
It may also be bad for consumers, not just in developed coun-
tries, but in all countries. The reason is that copying works against
efficiently maximizing drug creation. This occurs because allowing
copying reduces investment in drug discovery since investors will
46 See Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Pro-
vision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 525-
26 (1996) (discussing the rapid growth of the pharmaceutical industry in India,
which is currently one of the most competitive manufacturers of drugs in the
world); Bale, supra note 32, at 97 (identifying India and Argentina as developing
countries with "highly evolved" pharmaceutical industries). For a discussion re-
garding China, see Leslie Cataldo, Note, A Dynasty Weaned From Biotechnology: The
Emerging Face of China, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 151 (1998). For a discussion
regarding Brazil, see Christopher S. Mayer, Note, The Brazilian Pharmaceutical In-
dustry goes walking from Ipanema to Prosperity: Will New Intellectual Property Law
Spur Domestic Investment?, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 377 (1998).
47 See Bale, supra note 32, at 98 (comparing the costs of pirating with the costs
of innovation).
48 See AIDS Epidemic Traps Drug Firms in a Vise: Treatments vs. Profits, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at Al (noting that while drug companies have agreed to sell
some patented drugs for less in Africa, Cipla, the Indian pharmaceutical company
can still sell for less); A Problem of Patents, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2000, at 69 (citing
the example of Fluconazole, made by Pfizer at U.S. $10, and made by Cipla (India)
for 25 cents a tablet); Michael M. Phillips & Mark Schoofs, U.N's Annan Starts
AIDS Drug Campaign, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at A7 (reporting that Cipla's price
for AIDS drugs is forty percent cheaper than discounted prices of drug develop-
ers).
49 See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Selling Cheap 'Generic' Drugs, India's Copycats Irk
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A12 (citing examples of some of the drugs
copied by Cipla, including Erecto, a counterfeit of Viagra, and quoting Cipla's
managing director, "I make every Pfizer Product.").
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be less likely to obtain returns on investments.5 0 In developing
countries, a consequence of not efficiently maximizing drug crea-
tion is the failure of the international Life Sciences industry to fo-
cus on diseases and disorders that are very prevalent in developing
countries51 and LDCs, but less prevalent in developed countries.
52
So the success of "free-riding" pharmaceutical companies from de-
veloping countries, while profitable for the companies themselves,
may reduce the "profit" of world citizens as valued by improved
pharmaceuticals and the resulting increases in quality of life de-
rived from better medicines.
The effect of higher levels of protection has resulted in consid-
erable debate. On one side, commentators suggest that higher lev-
els of protection will result in maximizing drug creation in coun-
tries that have, to this point, primarily used their industrial Life
Sciences infrastructure to pirate.5 3 Higher levels of protection
should result in enhanced international R&D efforts to combat
health problems that are more prevalent in developing countries
50 Evidence suggests that developing countries that have implemented higher
standards of intellectual property protection have benefited. See, e.g., Gerald J.
Mossinghoff & Thomas Bombelles, The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection
to the American Research-Intensive Pharmaceutical Industry, 31 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.
38, 42-48 (1996) (reviewing the increase in R&D investment and patents granted
following the implementation of patent laws in Korea, Mexico, Japan, and Italy).
51 At least one authority suggests this may not be completely accurate. See
Arman S. Kirim, Transnational Corporations and Local Capital: Comparative Conduct
and Performance in the Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry, 14 WORLD DEV. 503, 516-17
(1986) (remarking on spurious product differentiation and the production and
promotion of drugs irrelevant to the leading causes of mortality in the country).
52 For facts regarding Lymphatic Filariasis, see WHO Information, Lymphatic
Filariasis, Fact Sheet No. 102 (Sept. 2000), at http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact
102.html.
Lymphatic Filariasis, known as Elephantiasis, puts at risk more than a
billion people in more than 80 countries. Over 120 million have already
been affected by it, over 40 million of them are seriously incapacitated
and disfigured by the disease. One-third of the people infected with the
disease live in India, one third are in Africa and most of the remainder
are in South Asia, the Pacific and the Americas.
Id. For facts regarding Malaria, see WHO Information, Malaria, Fact Sheet No. 94
(Oct. 1998), at http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact094.html ("Malaria is by far the
world's most important tropical parasitic disease, and kills more people than any
other communicable disease except tuberculosis. In many developing countries,
and in Africa especially, malaria exacts an enormous toll in lives, in medical costs,
and in days of labour lost.").
53 See, e.g., Adelman & Baldia, supra note 46, at 525-26 (explaining how India,
for example, has a group of bulk drug manufacturers that dominate the Indian
market and are considered fierce competitors worldwide).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss3/5
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and LDCs than in developed countries. Furthermore, it should en-
hance international competitiveness by increasing developing
countries' technical infrastructures, thus allowing developing
countries' Life Sciences industries to effectively compete in devel-
oped country markets.
On the other side, commentators have pointed to a slew of
wide-ranging negatives that may result from increasing intellectual
property protection in developing countries. Many concerns are
directed toward Life Sciences industries and a possible increase in
the price of pharmaceuticals that might result from higher levels of
intellectual property protection.5 4 However, this is a contentious
issue55 and proponents of protection argue that not only is innova-
54 See Carlos M. Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin
America: Is There Still Room for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109, 117-
19 (1997) (suggesting that moving too rapidly to a high level of intellectual prop-
erty protection, if such action results in an increase in the price of Life Sciences
products, could create domestic resistance to TRIPS implementation in develop-
ing countries); Sara M. Ford, Comment, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the
TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 948 n.35
(2000) (citing a WTO comittee report suggesting TRIPS implementation will re-
sult in increases in the cost of pharmaceutical products); Rosemary Sweeney,
Comment, The U.S. Push for Worldwide Patent Protection for Drugs Meets the AIDS
Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating Collision, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 445, 445-48
(2000) (discussing how the Thai people cannot afford the cost of new patented
AIDS therapies and how TRIPS implementation will prohibit Thai pharmaceutical
companies from copying patented new therapies from developed countries); see
also A Problem of Patents, supra note 46, at 69 (opining that heightened international
intellectual property standards will not allow generic manufacturers to sell copies
of patented drugs to poor countries); G8 SUMMIT: Heal first and Pay Later,
BANGKOK POST, Aug. 27, 2000 (opining that the G8 erred when it failed to commit
to relaxing international intellectual property standards because the standards
have "jacked up the prices of medicine," negatively affecting the poor's access to
medicines); "INTO - Shrink or Sink!": NGOs' Turn-Around Agenda, ECOLOGIST, Sept.
1, 2000, at 52 ("The TRIPS agreement promotes monopoly by transnational corpo-
rations [and] prevents access to essential medicines."); India Voices Concern Over
Including Health Under WTO, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA LTD., Nov. 2, 2000, available at
2000 WL 27415375 (reporting TRIPS has prevented India from importing raw ma-
terials for anti-retrovirals). Not surprisingly, the WTO feels intellectual property
rights are an important part of providing the proper balance between incentive
and reward for the creation of and access to drugs necessary to treat debilitating
diseases in developing and LDCs. See, e.g., Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, WTO
Deputy Director, An 'Appropriate Balance' for Public Health, Address Before the
European Commission (Sept. 28, 2000) in WTO NEws, Oct. 11, 2000 (emphasizing
the need for IPRs as necessary for improvements in public health and noting that
many of the drugs needed to combat disease in developing countries are not pres-
ently under patent, allowing generic industries to make and sell such drugs).
55 That increased intellectual property protection, in the form of patents, will
result in increased prices for pharmaceuticals is a disputed issue. See Bale, supra
note 32, at 101-02 (explaining how, if enforced, patenting pharmaceuticals can en-
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tion maximized, but also that consumers receive the best price
when patent protection exists. Other concerns are cultural - the
concept of intellectual property and its emphasis on private rights
may not be shared by other cultures.5 6 Another concern is that the
harmonization of trade is resulting in the homogenization of cul-
tures, an undesirable 57 result that justifies that a cultural exception
be granted to countries facing cultural domination.58 Other critics
view TRIPS implementation as a "polite form of economic imperi-
alism,"5 9 or as an assertion of a new regime of colonialism.
60 Still
others rail against the phenomenon of "biopiracy"- the exploita-
tion by developed countries of developing country and LDC biore-
sources, including the securing of property rights in existing de-
veloping country and LDC bioresources to transnational
corporations and the selling, or exclusion, as the case may be, of
the products and benefits of "pirated" bioresources back to devel-
oping nations and LDCs.
61
courage price competition and prevent generic producers from setting high mar-
ket prices); Mossinghoff & Bombelles, supra note 50, at 39 ("The world trading sys-
tem has recognized the damage caused to the pharmaceutical industry and to the
economic development of local industries by the lack of adequate and effective
patent protection.").
56 See William P. Alford, Making the World Safe For What? Intellectual Property
Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War
World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 135, 140-46 (1997) (positing that the Chinese do
not have an appreciation for private rights or IPRs similar to that in other coun-
tries).
57 See Judith Beth Prowda, U.S. Dominance in the "Marketplace of Culture" and
the French "Cultural Exception," 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 193, 208-10 (1997) (stat-
ing that cultural homogenization is a result that no one wants and arguing that
when a nation is battling cultural domination, it should be able to restrict free
trade).
58 See id. at 198. A rational extension of the anti-harmonization position ex-
tends to international intellectual property standards.
59 See A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS - Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic
Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 458-60 (1996) (noting that implemen-
tation of TRIPS will continue to force some developing and LDCs to be consumers
if they do not have the technical infrastructure and skill base to compete in
knowledge-based industries).
60 See Susan Demske, Trade Liberalization: De Facto Neocolonialism in West Af-
rica, 86 GEO. L.J. 155, 157 (1997) ("This subtle yet complex reinforcement of de-
pendency may be described as a de facto neocolonialism.. . . Classically, neocolo-
nialism has been defined as a conscious policy of economic domination.").
61 This complaint is often linked to existing cultural knowledge and is par-
ticularly persuasive when the bioresources obtained by developed countries were
identified by observing existing indigenous uses for the biological specimen and
enhanced when a Life Sciences company purified away the inactive components.




3.3. Least Developed Countries
Often the economies of LDCs lack either the skilled human
technical base or the technology infrastructure base to effectively
compete with foreign multinational corporations in the research,
development, and production of products that may be critical to
the health, welfare, and progress of their citizenry. Enforcing high
levels of protection of the IPRs of foreign corporations may exacer-
bate this problem by directly causing important goods to be finan-
cially inaccessible to citizens of LDCs. Another result of high levels
of protection may be the inhibition of technical development in less
developed economies. Without a skill base and any significant
technology infrastructure, there may be little incentive for invest-
ment in either the Life Sciences industry, a technical industry that
requires more investment than most others, 62 or in LDCs, because
they would not have a comparative competitive advantage. LDCs
may also be victims of biopiracy and may be vulnerable to the cul-
tural homogenization associated with a reduction in trade barri-
ers.
63
Sometimes LDCs are the consumers, the third countries to
whom intellectual property pirating companies from developing
countries Life Sciences industries direct their relatively inexpensive
products. When an LDC has sufficient resources to be a consumer
of pharmaceuticals produced by developing countries and if those
pharmaceuticals are under patent and not in the generic market,64
nous peoples. See Scott Holowick, Developing Nations and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1999 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
49 (2000) (describing examples of patents allowed on substances derived from Af-
rican plants, the indigenous uses for which were identical to the uses of the pat-
ented substance; discussing how TRIPS is detrimental to developing countries
and LDCs for ecological and environmental reasons and it asserts that TRIPS un-
dermines the biodiversity of developing countries and LDCs); see also Lakshmi
Sarma, Note, Biopiracy: Twentieth Century Imperialism in the Form of International
Agreements, 13 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 107, 134-36 (1999) (concluding that patent
laws need to be altered to protect indigenous knowledge in developing countries
and LDCs from Northern "colonialist ideals").
62 See, e.g., Bale, supra note 32, at 98 ("[T]he share of total expenditures allot-
ted to R&D by the pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry is much higher than in
any other important industrial sector.").
63 See Prowda, supra note 57, at 209 (discussing how "closing borders" is not
necessarily an action of animosity; rather, it is an act of cultural preservation).
64 Life Sciences products can be viewed as existing in one of two markets:
under patent -a period of time when the companies responsible for developing
the drug are recouping their investment, and in the generic market -when any-
one can legally make, use, and sell the product. After a product enters the generic
market, the price of that product typically decreases. See Bale, supra note 32, at
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the adoption of enforceable international intellectual property
standards may make LDCs vulnerable to price increases in critical
Life Sciences products. This is because, at least in the short term,
they will not be able to purchase pirated goods inexpensively. In
that case, revamped international intellectual property protection
would likely make it illegal for pirating developing country com-
panies to make and sell the drug to LDCs. This would result in a
reduction in availability (probably due to an increase in price) of
the drug in question in developing countries.
Since LDCs are not on the cusp of successful R&D and devel-
oped countries have not yet found ways to efficiently provide new
patented pharmaceuticals to LDCs, high levels of IPR protection
could be detrimental to LDCs. However, since LDCs typically do
not have well-developed Life Sciences industries, they are conse-
quently unlikely, in the short-term, to suffer from direct competi-
tion in the research, production, and distribution of pharmacologi-
cal agents.
As things stand, there may be several effects of lower levels of
protection. First, LDCs suffer the basic problem that weak IPR en-
forcement discourages innovation. The pirating that results from
the lack of IPR enforcement deprives citizens of LDCs (and all of
the world's citizens) of access to important drugs, because they are
not being made. Thus, the free-riding nature of developing coun-
tries Life Sciences industries, as a consequence of weak IPR en-
forcement, is injuring LDCs. Second, lower levels of protection in a
country coincide with poor investment in industries that rely on
intellectual property protection to encourage innovation. Thus,
lower levels of protection will not work in favor of LDCs obtaining
investment. This could maintain a domestic environment with lit-
tle skill base and little technical infrastructure. Thus, in the long
run, low levels of protection would be detrimental to LDCs.
As a practical matter, the near-term consequences to LDCs of
low or negligible international intellectual property protection may
be similar to the consequences of high levels of protection. In other
words, these countries may be sufficiently non-competitive as to
make them insulated from the positive or negative effects of a
strong or weak international intellectual property regime.
For example, higher levels of protection theoretically result in
more investment in innovation with a resulting increase in quality
101 (discussing the two forms of pharmaceutical price competition that exist in




of drugs to fight disease. If citizens of LDCs cannot financially af-
ford these drugs, they are not likely to have access to them. So the
fact that the drugs exist may mean little. Likewise, if the drugs are
never created, because of low levels of international IPR protection,
citizens of LDCs will not have access to them. Also, if higher levels
of protection result in increased investment in innovation, the fact
that LDCs do not have a technical skill or infrastructure base will
make them unlikely candidates for R&D investment, even though
labor costs might otherwise be less expensive. So the fact that
more investment is occurring may simply enlarge the economic po-
larity between developed and developing countries versus LDCs.
In sum, the effect of high levels of international intellectual prop-
erty protection on LDCs will, in the short term, likely be minimal,
and in the long term, may increase the ground needed to be cov-
ered by LDCs to become competitive economies in a global market.
4. TRIPS STANDARDS
The TRIPS Agreement acts to protect IPRs in all WTO member
countries. Developing countries should have introduced the
minimum standards of intellectual property protection, as promul-
gated under the 1994 Agreement, into their domestic laws by Janu-
ary 1, 2000. LDCs have until 2005 to implement the Agreement. 65
Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, in many countries,
requires the affirmative act of creating or modifying a substantive
body of law.66 67 Requirements for patentability are articulated in
Article 27 of TRIPS.68 Article 27 proceeds by stating: "patents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in
65 Extensions are possible. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 66 ("The
Council shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-developed country
[miember, accord extensions of this period.").
66 See id. art. 1 ("Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method
of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system
and practice.").
67 Some commentators have suggested that this is a very significant cost, es-
pecially due to the introduction and maintenance of the judicial and administra-
tive infrastructures. See Robert M. Sherwood et al., Promotion of Inventiveness in
Developing Countries Through a More Advanced Patent Administration, 39 IDEA 473
(1999); see also McCabe, supra, note 36 at 54-56 (arguing that a strong intellectual
property protection regime is inappropriate in developing countries); Robert M.
Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA
491, 522-44 (1996-97) (discussing the kinds of costs and measures needed to im-
plement TRIPS in countries where they did not previously have the infrastructure
needed to do so).
68 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27.
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all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an in-
ventive step, and are capable of industrial application." 69 The re-
quirements for patentability, "involve an inventive step," and "are
capable of an industrial application" are intended to be viewed as
synonymous70 with "non-obvious" 71 and "useful"
72 respectively. 73
The TRIPS Agreement has several provisions designed to pro-
tect member nations in the event of anti-competitive practices by
IPR holders, emergencies, and situations where the public interest
mandates obviating or suspending the property right.74 TRIPS
states: "Member [countries] may exclude from patentability inven-
tions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial ex-
ploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality,
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to
avoid serious prejudice to the environment." 75 This limitation is
itself limited by the condition that the "exclusion is not made
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law."
76
The Agreement further allows member countries to exclude from
patentability, "diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for
the treatment of humans or animals" 77 as well as "plants and ani-
mals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological proc-
esses for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes."
78
Article 30 of the Agreement allows "limited" 79 exceptions to the
rights conferred8 0 that do not "unreasonably conflict with a normal
69 Id.
70 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27 n.5 ("For purposes of this Arti-
cle, the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' may be
deemed by a member [country] to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious'
and 'useful' respectively.").
74 See id. art. 27(2).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27(2).
78 Id.
79 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 30.
80 See id. art. 28. The rights conferred to patentees in the Agreement are as
follows: (a) to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling,
or importing a product; and (b) where the subject matter is a process, to prevent
third parties from using the process, using, offering for sale, selling or importing




exploitation of the patent"81 and do not "unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the patent owner." 82 Article 31 of the
Agreement establishes authorization for compulsory licensing and
articulates the requirements that must be met for a member nation
to effect compulsory licensing.
83
Discussion regarding the prospective effectiveness of the provi-
sions allowing the exclusion of certain subject matter from pat-
entability,84 the limitations on the "rights conferred," 85 and the
compulsory licensing provision 86 has been significant.87 Some
commentators believe that the provisions provide a framework for
developing countries to manage public health concerns by either
excluding important drugs from patent protection or compelling
foreign IPR holders to license at affordable rates.88 Some have sug-
gested that certain of the provisions may actually expand a mem-
ber country's opportunity to limit the patentee's grant.89 Others
commentators view the IPR limiting provisions of TRIPS as serious
81 See id. art. 30.
82 Id.
83 Note that the drafters expressly state that Article 31 does not displace am-
ember's option to exercise rights under Article 30. See TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 17, art. 31 n.7.
84 See id. art. 27.
85 See id. art. 30.
86 See id. art. 31.
87 Effectiveness is often measured by the practical effectiveness of these pro-
visions in protecting developing countries from perceived insults resulting from
the actions of transnational corporations protecting intellectual property rights.
These include price increases in important pharmaceuticals, as well as exclusion-
ary tactics -for instance, the failure of an IPR holder to work an important patent
in a particular country. Also, effectiveness is viewed as whether or not these pro-
visions effectively disable what might otherwise be critical IPR grants by allowing
developing countries and LDCs to avoid establishing and enforcing protection.
88 See, e.g., Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Indus-
try Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Le-
gal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069,
1116-24 (1996) (describing how developing countries may use some of the provi-
sions to their advantage to restrict drugs prices).
89 See Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 18, at 355 (com-
menting on Article 30: "These and other articles ... preserve, and may even ex-
pand, preexisting grounds for limiting a patentee's exclusive rights."). The same
author suggests interpretation of the compulsory licensing provision may be con-
troversial. He notes that the United States has typically required a finding of "an-
ticompetitive practices bordering on antitrust violations" to justify compulsory
licensing. Id. Many other countries consider it sufficient that a patentee does not
work a patent locally, refuses to grant licenses on reasonable terms, does not sup-
ply the national market with sufficient quantities of the product, or demands ex-
cessive prices for the product. Id.
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concerns because they are too broad and may encourage the exclu-
sion from protection of important pharmaceutical products90 and
discourage the biotechnology industry.91
This Comment takes a different approach to the evaluation of
TRIPS. It does so not with the thought that the exclusionary provi-
sions of TRIPS must be ineffective, but because, for certain devel-
oping nations, a much more effective strategy may be to embrace
international intellectual property standards. 92 Therefore, rather
than evaluating clauses in the TRIPS Agreement that permit exclu-
sion for subject matter from protection, this Comment will show
that by intelligently implementing and enforcing substantive intel-
lectual property standards, particular developing countries can
faithfully implement TRIPS and in so doing, utilize internal admin-
istrative and judicial policy to maximize their benefits. The result
of intelligent TRIPS implementation for these countries could be a
comparative competitive advantage in the Life Sciences industry.
5. INTELLIGENT TRIPS IMPLEMENTATION
Throughout this discussion, the reader may consider that a de-
veloping country may be able to achieve the results postulated by
not entering the TRIPS Agreement at all. This seems unlikely as
non-member nations place themselves in the unenviable position
of possible multilateral cross-sectoral sanctions for violating mem-
ber nations' IPRs. In addition, they would not gain from the trade
concessions that resulted from the TRIPS negotiations. By imple-
menting TRIPS with an eye to the considerations included in the
discussion, a nation can gain the moral and legal high ground of
90 See Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection
in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 478 (1994) (not-
ing that the subject matter exclusions are very broad and that the biotechnology
exclusions substantially limit the biotechnology industry).
91 See, e.g., Skarstad, supra note 31, at 383-84 (noting that exclusion of biotech-
nology from IPR protection negatively affects the development of Life Sciences
industry).
92 Excluding subject matter from patentabililty using the exclusionary clauses
of TRIPS prevents the commercial exploitation of the subject matter. Excluding
material in this manner preempts compulsory licensing and disallows the use of
generic manufacturers to make the drugs in question. It arguably permits only
the government of an excluding country to make and, in a non-profit manner,
provide the drugs only to its population. This is unlikely to create the Life Sci-
ences Industry infrastructure necessary to promote industry and perhaps even the
production and distribution of the products in question. See Weissman, supra note
88, at 1100 (discussing the effects of requiring "the denial of patentability to be




having and enforcing substantive intellectual property standards
that comply with those articulated in TRIPS. Absent unilateral ac-
tion,93 which is unjustified under the Agreement against a comply-
ing member nation, member nations are directed to the WTO Dis-
pute Resolution Body ("DSB") to acquire satisfaction in disputes
involving IPRs. Because this is an impartial panel, victories in this
forum can be very powerful tools in further defining international
intellectual property standards.
As noted, TRIPS implementation requires member nations to
grant patents for "any inventions," 94 whether "products or proc-
esses,"95 that are new, involve an inventive step (non-obvious), and
are capable of industrial application (useful). In the United States
there exists over a century and a half of case law defining the
meaning of new, useful, and non-obvious. In some countries,
forced by TRIPS to implement language synonymous standards,
there is no administrative nor judicial definition of the legal mean-
ing of these terms with regards to patentability. In others, intellec-
tual property laws exist as recent statutory constructions, 96 created
in response to threats of sanctions by the United States and other
developed countries, and that have yet to be uniformly enforced.
If the United States is any example, determining the meaning of the
terms that compose the elements of patentability is no mean feat.
Developing countries that intelligently implement TRIPS may seri-
ously consider the ramifications of the legal definition of these
terms as they create the legal and administrative infrastructure
necessary to grant and enforce patents. Done properly they can set
these standards to create a comparative competitive advantage
relative to developed countries.
93 The United States is still prepared to utilize Section 301 regarding intellec-
tual property disputes. See, e.g., Section 301 Table of Cases (Aug. 9, 1999), available
at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/301report/act301 (showing the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative's initiation of investigation regarding Intellectual Property Laws and
Practices of the Government of Paraguay in 1998).
94 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Cataldo, supra note 46, at 151 (noting China's recent renovation of
its intellectual property laws).
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5.1. What is New?
What is new? Examine a hypothetical posited by Ruth Gana.97
Imagine that a Life Sciences company observed the native people
of a developing country using a particular plant to treat malaria.
The native people have limited but observable success. If they
have been practicing this behavior for a significant period of time,
patenting their use of the plant in such a manner may be barred,98
at least in the United States, by the statutory bar.99 If the Life Sci-
ences company obtains the biological material and purifies away
the active ingredient, or purifies the active ingredient to some sub-
stantially purified form, they will likely satisfy the "new" require-
ment of patentability for what is essentially the same biochemically
active ingredient. 100
Although the United States qualifies such a purification step as
new," it does not require another country (or the DSB) to view
what is essentially a technical purification as resulting in "new"
matter. For developing countries implementing TRIPS, there is
significant leeway in defining the term "new." If the term is de-
fined broadly, that is, existing matter is given a broad definition,101
the result is a narrowing of the field of patentable subject matter.
In our example, if a broad definition of the native people's plant
preparation is used, it may no longer be "new" to create some oth-
erwise purified, or more purified, form of the same active ingredi-
ent. Alternatively, interpreting the term "new" in the narrowest
sense may, by giving existing subject matter a narrow definition,
allow even the most trivial changes in purification state to qualify
as "new." 102 In our example, this vastly expands the field of pat-
97 See Ruth Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agree-
ment, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 749-50 (1996) (discussing the "complex ap-
plication of rules" that is used to define the word "new").
98 See id.
99 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
100 See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
The opinion, written by Learned Hand, stands for the proposition that in the con-
text of the Life Sciences, a substantial purification of an existing biochemical activ-
ity, can qualify as a "new" composition of matter. It is also under a similar theory
that DNA sequences are patentable-DNA purified away from the surrounding
cellular architecture results in a "new" composition of matter.
101 Depending upon how broad a description existing matter is permitted, the
,new" requirement may approach the requirement for nonobviousness.
102 This is a position favored by commentators concerned about the interests
of developing countries in TRIPS implementation; they suggest that the broaden-




entable subject matter because small changes in the purification
state or the use of other purification methodology resulting in ac-
tual useful activity and yield, but other inactive ingredients, may
become patentable subject matter. A developing country imple-
menting the "new" prong of TRIPS would need to decide what
type of definition "new" should receive. This decision would
likely be based upon the economic, legal, and political needs of the
country in question.
As a practical matter, a country that chooses to allow a very
broad description or definition of existing matter will give fewer
patents because applicants will have a more difficult time satisfy-
ing the "new" requirement. The patentability bar will be higher.
Following this reasoning to its natural conclusion, the most sophis-
ticated and innovative individuals will get patents. Few others
will. A country that employs a narrow interpretation of the "new"
requirement, and thus permits only a narrow definition of existing
matter, will grant a large number of patents. They will set the bar
for patentability lower. That small differences make a subsequent
invention "new" will allow individuals who had very little inven-
tive contribution to obtain patents on what are, for the most part,
the inventions of others that are arguably already in the public
domain.
Following our purification example, a country employing a
narrow description of existing subject matter may, in the context of
a biochemical purification, allow a patent for a pharmaceutical in-
vention that performs an identical function, in an identical or sub-
stantially similar way, with an identical or substantially similar re-
sult. However, a country giving a broad definition to existing
matter would not grant a patent for the above purification because
it failed to satisfy the requirement that the invention be new.
5.2. What is Useful?
In the past, some countries, including at least one "developed"
country, prevented foreign patentees from obtaining a patent un-
less the patentee established a new industry in that country
through the patent.103 The TRIPS-mandated national and most fa-
that cannot compete in high-technology Life Sciences industries. See, e.g., Gana,
supra note 97, at 750 (arguing that a low level of inventiveness is important for the
progress of developing countries).
103 See id. at 746 ("Prior to the Paris Convention, .. . Spain and Bolivia did not
grant patents for inventions unless such [i]nventions, in addition to being new,
also established a new industry [i]n the country.").
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vored nation treatments make any such interpretation by develop-
ing countries unlikely. Such an interpretation would likely be too
restrictive and too far removed from a reasonable definition of
"useful." Between "new," "capable of an industrial application,"
and "involve an inventive step," "capable of an industrial applica-
tion" as a synonym of "useful" may be the requirement with the
least flexibility.
However, the utility of an invention can be a critical compo-
nent of patentability. In the United States, recent decisions seem to
have expanded the definition of useful.104 This has allowed the
patenting of the application of algorithms.105 The result is that a
patent application that recites a practical utility most likely satisfies
the utility element of patentable subject matter.
In the realm of the Life Sciences, the patentability of Expressed
Sequence Tags ("ESTs") has been of particular concern.1 06 ESTs
themselves, while valuable research tools, typically have little
other utility. However, ESTs can be used to identify the complete
sequence of the underlying gene using well-established experimen-
tal methods. Since ESTs typically represent the partial sequence
composition of the underlying gene, many individuals have tried
to use EST sequences to claim through to the underlying gene.
When that is not possible, individuals have tried to claim the se-
quence itself with the idea that using "comprising" or "consisting
104 See e.g., State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (discussing application of the definition
of "useful"); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-434-SLR,
1999 WL 1050064, at *6 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 1999) (applying standard set by State St.
Bank v. Signature Fin. Group for the definition of "useful").
105 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1372 (discussing the "mathematical algo-
rithm" exception).
106 Most cells in the bodies of higher organisms contain a full complement of
the genes of the respective organism. Cells in different tissues and often in differ-
ent disease states are different because they express different parts of the genome
than other cell types or cells not in a disease state. Differential expression of cer-
tain regions of DNA from the human genome occur because different regions of
the genome are transcribed from DNA into another nucleic acid, RNA, which is
then translated into protein. Techniques exist for identifying and sequencing
RNA molecules or portions thereof. These molecules are ESTs. Identifying and
sequencing ESTs is important for many reasons, including their ability to identify
the genes that they represent. They are very important research tools. However,
outside of that use, many of the ESTs do not have a practical utility. Even so, be-
cause ESTs can be used to identify the sequence composition of, usually part, but
sometimes all, of the underlying genes from which they were transcribed, re-
searchers and corporations have used the sequence information obtained from




essentially of" language will allow them to control the use of the
underlying gene once it is ultimately cloned.
At least partly in response to this, the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office has issued new utility standards which require the
patentee to assert at least one "well-established utility," i.e., one
that is "specific, substantial, and credible." 10 7 This does not appear
to include the use of ESTs as research tools to identify the underly-
ing gene and thus will probably operate to reduce the number of
patents granted on ESTs.
A developing country or LDC can modulate the level of utility.
The language used by the TRIPS agreement, while claiming to be
synonymous with "useful" 08 as it is used in the United States, is
actually "capable of an industrial application." 10 9 Such language
could easily be construed as requiring a higher standard than "use-
ful" as it now stands in the United States. Regarding business
methods and applications of algorithms, such language is perhaps
permissive. Regarding ESTs, whose application is typically as a re-
search tool, such language could easily be viewed as hostile to
awarding patents. Indeed, such language might be interpreted as
hostile to a range of gene based biotechnology reagents whose in-
dustrial application is only theoretically possible,11° rather than
practically possible.
There may be advantages to a country that will disallow the
patenting of ESTs as compared to a country that will allow the pat-
enting of ESTs. Since ESTs are not typically valuable for practical
applications other than as a research tool, allowing protection of
ESTs would result in allowing protection of a research tool. By do-
ing so, the property right holder would be able to prohibit others
from using the EST to find the underlying gene and perhaps even
from using the underlying gene. If, as I suggest is possible, using
the "capable of an industrial application" requirement, a country
can, under TRIPS, exclude ESTs from patentable subject matter, it
107 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097 (Jan. 5, 2001).
108 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (codifying the requirements under which an in-
dividual can obtain a patent).
109 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27.
110 This might include a wide array of gene therapy applications. While there
is a good basic understanding of what needs to be done and possession of the
gene sequences allows their use in therapy, the practical problems of effectively
introducing these genes into subjects and getting a sustained or regulable re-
sponse is a problem that still needs to be refined before these genes can generally
be used in humans.
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may create a competitive advantage relative to countries that allow
the protection of ESTs.
This scenario is perhaps particularly bad for the country that
protects ESTs because the public is not getting significant practical
utility from the ESTs even though they have granted a property
right to the EST discoverer. Thus, distinct from a pharmaceutical
compound, from which, for a price, the public will get a benefit, in
the case of EST protection, the public is not getting the near-term
benefit of the utility. Rather, the public is expressing the confi-
dence that the party that discovers and patents an EST is somehow
the party most motivated and able to eventually turn it into some-
thing of value to the public.
A country that does not allow protection of ESTs can allow
multiple parties to use the EST to come up with a practical utility.
This should be an ideal circumstance because it incentivizes multi-
ple actors to achieve the practical result. After that result is
achieved, the winner of that race can obtain a patent. This situa-
tion is not the same as weak protection. Neither, I suspect, will it
result in companies not identifying and using ESTs. ESTs are not
so hard to identify, in fact, they can be obtained in a mechanized
manner. Since the economic and public benefit is downstream
from the EST anyway, disallowing the protection of ESTs that have
no practical utility should not result in failure to encourage re-
search using EST reagents.
5.3. Non-obvious
The non-obvious111 ("involve an inventive step") requirement
is perhaps the ultimate bar to patentability." 2 Considerable juris-
prudence has evolved in the United States regarding the term and
its application to patent law.113 In the United States the doctrine of
non-obviousness acts to prevent patentability, if, given the prior
art, the invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art.114 The purpose of the non-obviousness requirement is to
111 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
112 See generally PORCELLI & DRAGSETH, supra note 44, at 138 ("Non-
obviousness is really the most significant hurdle an aspiring patentee must
clear.").
113 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965) (discussing the na-
ture of the term "nonobvious").
114 See id. at 14 ("Patentability is to depend... upon the 'non-obvious' nature





complement the novelty requirement. From a certain perspective,
patentability is all about novelty. Non-obviousness can be under-
stood as a way to "bump-up" 115 the novelty requirement so that
subject matter for which a patent is granted has a conceptual or in-
ventive newness that could otherwise easily be escaped if new only
meant not having existed before. Non-obviousness, because of its
conceptual nature, is very difficult to pin down, and thus, has con-
siderable interpretive flexibility.
Because of the relationship between "non-obvious" and "new,"
the issues that arise in the context of patentability decisions can be
similar. Returning to the example of the indigenous use of a plant
or plant extract to treat a particular disease,116 it seems clear that at
least in some circumstances, making a plant extract by another
procedure, so that the resulting extract has different inactive ingre-
dients or a different concentration of biological activity, or both,
can reasonably be viewed as obvious.
The language of the TRIPS Agreement, intended to be analo-
gous to "non-obvious" is "involve an inventive step."" 7 It is cer-
tainly arguable that there is not a conceptual inventive step in try-
ing purification protocols to obtain what is only a "differently"
purified active ingredient. Even if the results of the experimenta-
tion are not absolutely predictable, the application of a number of
standard purification protocols to determine whether the desired
activity can be purified may not "involve an inventive step."
Rather, it involves some repetitive work. Work nowadays is often
done by machines. Thus, a country implementing TRIPS might
decide to mandate that its version of the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice find that the results of such purifications do not "involve an
inventive step" and are thus not patentable.
In the United States, in the field of biotechnology, it is possible
to get a patent on things that are reasonably viewed as obvious,"18
for instance, the patenting of a DNA sequence obtained by reverse
translation' 19 of the primary amino acid structure of a protein 20
115 Author's quotation.
116 See supra Section 5.1.
117 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27.
118 See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 833 (1999) (discussing the lowered bar for
patentability in the context of obviousness).
119 This involves obtaining the amino acid sequence for part of a protein and
using the genetic code, which specifies the nucleic acid sequences that could give
2004] 1157
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
The techniques required to obtain the DNA sequence in this man-
ner are well defined.121 The genetic code is known. 122 Yet the Fed-
eral Circuit views DNA sequences obtained in this manner as
"non-obvious."123
The result of this judicial interpretation of obviousness is that,
as a practical matter "any given DNA sequence.., is obvious only
if the prior art actually recites a similar or identical sequence." 124
This has encouraged Life Sciences companies to seek patents on
vast numbers of DNA sequence fragments that they have isolated
through routine automated methods. 125  Employing non-
obviousness in such a manner "significantly impoverishes"1 26 the
public domain and suggests that citizens of the United States are
paid too little for the "embarrassment" 27 of granting a patent.
A similar and related example is the problem of homologues.
Homologues are distinct molecules of substantially the same struc-
ture. Due to the similarity in structure, homologues often have
substantially the same or similar functional characteristics. A legal
interpretation that makes a molecule obvious only if the prior art
discloses exactly the same molecule allows for the granting of
rights for an invention that, from some perspectives, is reasonably
viewed as obvious.
A developing country or an LDC need not adopt such stan-
dards of non-obviousness; the TRIPS Agreement does not require
it. Instead, it could decide that when an experimental result is a
near certainty, the result is obvious. It might then reject patent ap-
plications directed to such subject matter as obvious, and, in the
parlance of the TRIPS Agreement, not involving an inventive step.
Countries that choose to adopt such standards will need to be con-
rise to such an amino acid sequence, along with standard experimental tech-
niques, to obtain the original DNA sequence that encodes the protein.
120 See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557-60 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
121 See Rai, supra note 118, at 833 (describing the steps necessary to obtain a
DNA sequence).
122 See id.
123 See id. at 834 (discussing why DNA sequences are nonobvious).
124 Id. at 834.
125 See generally Eliot Marshall, Patent Office Faces 90-Year Backlog, 272 SCIENCE
643 (1996) (noting that there has been a flood of new patent applications for DNA
sequences).
126 See Rai, supra note 118, at 833.
127 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW





cerned with how such a choice will affect the economic incentives
of Life Sciences companies. However, observed from a global per-
spective, the patentability of this subject matter in one country
(e.g., a developed country) as compared to its unpatentability in
another (developing countries and LDCs) may influence the deci-
sion of the latter because of the possible ramifications of having a
competitive environment where there is a greater amount of sub-
patentable information relative to that of a competitor where there
is relative overprotection.
This exodus of "obvious" information from the public domain
to private coffers is precisely the sort of concern that developing
countries and LDCs have regarding the Life Sciences and the abil-
ity of developed countries to sew up IPRs before developing coun-
tries and LDCs can compete effectively in the Life Sciences indus-
try. TRIPS does not require adhering countries to adopt such a
generous view of obviousness in the Life Sciences. A developing
nation intelligently implementing TRIPS may rightly and reasona-
bly view such above-mentioned "inventions" as obvious and disal-
low them within the context of a consistent, TRIPS-legal, and
transparent patent policy. The result of such a policy would be to
raise the bar for patentability. Fewer patents would be granted
and more subject matter could remain in the public domain.
Alternatively, a developing country might adopt standards
similar to those of the United States. This would lower the bar for
patentability. More patents would be granted on things that could
easily have been figured out. In such an environment, second
comers (and maybe even third comers) would be able to get pat-
ents from the discoveries of the original innovator.
5.4. Written Description/Enablement
It is often the goal of those prosecuting patents to get the
broadest claims possible allowed. This permits the patentee to lay
claim to the greatest amount of subject matter. In the field of Life
Sciences, the Federal Circuit has used an interpretation of the writ-
ten description requirement in an effort to narrow the scope of pro-
tection.128 The Federal Circuit now requires that an applicant for a
patent grant actually isolate and sequence a DNA molecule in or-
128 See Rai, supra note 118, at 834 n.48 (discussing the effect of a "written de-
scription" requirement).
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der to sufficiently describe it.129 Consequently, it is not sufficient to
simply describe the amino acid sequences that comprise a gene
product, combined with a method for isolating the DNA molecule,
to describe the DNA molecule. The specific molecular structure of
the molecule must be known and disclosed.
The TRIPS Agreement has a written description requirement,
130
which uses language similar to that used in the U.S. requirement.'
31
Basically, the requirement is that "applicant[s] for a patent shall
disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete
for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the
art.... "132 Developing countries intelligently implementing TRIPS
may use the written description requirement to raise or lower the
bar for patentability by requiring more or less description of the
invention in the application. They might also use the written de-
scription requirement to narrow or enlarge the scope of protection.
In the Life Sciences realm, one way to treat nucleic acid and
amino acid sequence information is to require that the written de-
scription include the complete structure (the primary sequence
structure) of the claimed molecule. Furthermore, when interpret-
ing the scope of the claim, allow it to cover only the disclosed se-
quence. By such an interpretation, and by requiring "consisting
of" instead of "consisting essentially of" or "comprising"-type lan-
guage, the patent grant is effectively narrowed.
Alternatively, allowing for substantially similar sequences to be
sufficiently described by the disclosure of one specific sequence
will allow a broadening of the patent grant. This is a possible in-
terpretation, because as a practical matter, substantially similar se-
quences often perform substantially similar functions. A country
wanting to broaden the grant even more might allow the disclo-
sure of a single specific sequence to cover a broader range of simi-
lar sequences.
However, there are good reasons not to allow the description of
single sequence to enable many other sequences. While substan-
tially similar sequences do often perform the same functions, small
changes in the sequence can make certain specific sequences func-
129 See, e.g., Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(describing the amino acid sequence for insulin and a method for obtaining the
DNA sequence in a claim to the DNA sequence).
130 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 29.
131 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).




tionally distinct and functionally superior to an existing or well
known sequence. A proper goal of intellectual property policy
should be to encourage companies and investigators to identify
those special sequences, sometimes different from naturally occur-
ring forms, that might be highly therapeutically valuable to the
public.
5.5. The Scope of Protection
When a country construes existing patented subject matter nar-
rowly it decreases the scope of protection. Less scope means less
protected matter and therefore theoretically allows for the patent-
ing of new matter that is not anticipated by existing patented sub-
ject matter. Alternatively, construing the scope of existing patents
broadly, to cover a large amount of subject matter, may reduce the
number of patents granted because there is less unpatented matter.
One way to examine the scope of a patent is to examine when a
patent is infringed. In the United States, a patent can be infringed
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Under a theory of lit-
eral infringement, in order for a device to be considered infringing,
each and every element of the patentee's claim must be present in
the accused device. Therefore, if the accused device differs in in-
substantial ways it may not infringe by literal infringement.
In the United States, if an accused device does not literally in-
fringe, it may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to achieve substantially the same result as the protected de-
vice.133 In this manner, the scope of protection for claimed subject
matter is broadened because while the accused device does not lit-
erally fall under the claims of the patent, we are prepared to find
that it infringes anyway. The general policy is that patent protec-
tion would be weak, if not nonexistent, if competing parties could
make small changes to patented subject matter and not be liable for
infringement. If this were possible, the scope of protection would
be very narrow, so narrow in fact that it might likely act to reduce
the incentive of individuals to invest time and money in inventive
behavior.
133 See infra note 134.
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TRIPS does not contain a "doctrine of equivalents" 134 provision.
Therefore, countries adopting the agreement are not required to
enforce patent rights against possibly infringing devices that differ
only insubstantially from the patented device. The effect of a lack
of a doctrine of equivalents-or of very narrow protection-is a
concern distinct from how high or low the bar for patentability is
set.
A legal regime that enforced infringement liability only for the
literal scope of patent claims with certain Life Sciences subject mat-
ter could have a dramatic effect. Sequences can often be changed
without significant functional effect. Thus, if claims were directed
to the DNA sequence of a gene or EST that had a defined primary
(sequence) structure, small changes in that sequence could likely be
made that would not cause a significant difference in function, but
would make the changed sequence literally different from the
claimed one. The biotechnological tools necessary to make such
changes are well known and can be used successfully by even rela-
tively unsophisticated parties. Thus, a patent on a particular se-
quence, in the absence of some sort of equivalents regime is likely
to be very narrow protection indeed.
5.6. How Should a Developing Country Implement TRIPS Patents?
As noted in the above examples, there are numerous ways that
developing nations can apply the standards for patentability
promulgated in the TRIPS Agreement to modulate the bar for pat-
entability and the scope of protection. A critical question then, will
be how should a developing nation implement patentability stan-
dards.
Some commentators have suggested that developing countries
and LDCs should endeavor to set the bar low, that is, make pat-
entability easy.13 5 One possible result of such a strategy would be
to make patents more accessible to domestic enterprises that are
less competitive than their foreign counterparts from developed
countries. However, an alternative result is that a low bar simply
134 The doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent the practice of fraud on a
patent. It prohibits patenting of minor changes that, while not literally infringing
claims, perform substantially the same function, in substantially the same way to
achieve substantially the same result. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (articulating the function-way-result test for
doctrine of equivalents).
135 See, e.g., Gana supra note 97, at 751 (suggesting that a lower innovation re-




makes patents too easy to get. Transnational pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies are some of the most sophisticated en-
terprises at obtaining patents. In an environment of easy pat-
entability with a low non-obvious hurdle, a more likely result of a
low bar would be that transnational Life Sciences companies
would be able to secure vast amounts of intellectual property. This
would sequester large amounts of subject matter from the public
domain resulting in a comparative competitive disadvantage for
developing countries' Life Sciences industries. The competitive
disadvantage would arise because they would be excluded from
making, using, and selling products, or products of processes
made with protected intellectual property. This sequestration of
information, then, reduces the subject matter that developing coun-
tries' Life Sciences companies can use to pursue R&D.
Rather than setting the bar for patentability low, there are good
reasons for developing nations to set the bar higher. If developing
countries with a substantial Life Sciences industrial infrastructure
and technical skill base136 pursue a patent policy, based upon
TRIPS, that requires a higher bar for patentability, they may create
a comparative competitive advantage for themselves over devel-
oped nations.
It is a common premise that not having intellectual property
protection in the form of patents is economically inefficient. It is
also a common premise that allowing too much protection in the
form of patents is economically inefficient. This occurs because too
much information is taken from the public domain. The result is a
restriction in the flow and utilization of information. When this
happens, it limits the number of individuals who can use that in-
formation to innovate and create next generation products. 37 In
the context of this model, the Author proposes that developing
countries adopt a strategy in which they set the bar for patentabil-
ity higher than it presently exists in developed countries, rather
than lower.
136 For examples, see supra Section 3.2.
137 Indeed, a helpful analogy may be the difference in Trade Secret laws be-
tween the Northeastern United States and California. It has been postulated that
the reduced enforceability of restrictive covenants and greater employee flow
causes a greater flow of subpatentable information. The result of this has been
greater innovation in California, relative to that achieved in the Mid-Atlantic and
New England States in recent years. See, e.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL
ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994)
(comparing Silicon Valley with Route 128 in Boston because both areas are known
as leading centers for electronics).
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This proposal is obviously subject to the criticism that given the
competitive abilities of developed countries, developing nations
would be able to get few domestic patents. While this seems true
in the short term, the result is not likely to be different if develop-
ing countries set a very low bar for patentability. Transnational
corporations with sophisticated R&D and patenting abilities would
simply get even more patents, to the disadvantage of developing
countries industry and economy. The advantage of setting the pat-
entability bar higher relative to developed countries, yet still
within TRIPS standards, is that it preserves a wealth of subpat-
entable information in the public domain in developing countries
that has been excluded from the public domain in developed coun-
tries.
As a consequence, this information is available domestically for
R&D toward the end of creation of next-generation products.
While it is true that patented products and products of patented
processes may not be made abroad and imported back to the
United States absent a license, in countries faithfully implementing
TRIPS, products and processes may be used for research purposes
to attain next generation products and processes. These next gen-
eration products and processes will be patentable subject matter
and will thus be eligible for protection in both the United States
and other countries. Since in the United States only a limited
number of companies may use patented products and processes
for R&D purposes, 138 competition will be reduced relative to the
developing country where, because the information is in the public
domain, anyone and everyone may use it to develop next genera-
tion products. This pro-competitive environment should encour-
age foreign and domestic investment and may ultimately result in
the transfer of R&D operations from developed to developing
countries that follow this policy. These countries have an even
greater advantage in that while they have the skill base, their hu-
man resources are comparatively inexpensive. This further incen-
tivizes the transfer of R&D because in addition to access to more
usable information, foreign and domestic companies can do the re-
search at a lower cost.139 Cooperatively, the result is a comparative
138 This includes the patentee and his licensees.
139 See Joseph Straus, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for On-
going Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transac-
tions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 91, 96 (1998) (noting that globalization offers in-
ternationally active enterprises the real choice of locating their R&D and




competitive advantage for countries intelligently implementing
TRIPS.
5.7. Raising the Bar
If a country is to set the bar higher, how should it do it? What
is the best way to do it? What about complementary considera-
tions such as scope of claims as determined by infringement analy-
sis?
Developing countries with a significant Life Sciences infrastruc-
ture can use each of the concepts of "new," "capable of an indus-
trial application" (useful), and "involve an inventive step" (nonob-
vious) to raise the bar for patentability for biotechnological
inventions.
As noted in Section 5.1., one way to raise the bar is to utilize the
novelty requirement. In the example of the anti-malaria drug, na-
tive people used an extract of an indigenous plant for some period
of time. If a developing country charged its Patent and Trademark
Office to not allow patents for routine and alternative purifications
of biologically active agents from known existing sources, what ef-
fect would that have?
In this case, where the active ingredient is unknown, yet
known to exist within a particular plant, it may well be that not al-
lowing the patenting of the active ingredient as either a product or
process is an acceptable approach for a developing country. While
the actual active ingredient in a plant preparation may not be
known, it is localized to the plant. All a Life Sciences company
need do is try any one of a number of established purification pro-
tocols to make the active ingredient more pure. While this will re-
quire investment on the part of the Life Sciences company, it may
not be an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus, the
cost, in the cost versus profit opportunity consideration, is likely to
be less than that required for the development of other drugs. Af-
ter all, some other party, namely an indigenous population, has
identified the source of the drug. The Life Sciences company does
not have to send scientists and researchers out to screen hundreds
of thousands of plants and animals to find this one.
tage). The article uses as an example Daimler-Benz's moving of software devel-
opment to India, where skilled labor exists and is relatively inexpensive. See id.
Another example is the migration of biotechnological activities from Europe to the
United States and Japan. See id. at 96-98.
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If the up-front cost is reduced, less total profit need be made in
order for the developing country's Life Sciences company to re-
coup its investment. If the purified active ingredient is patentable
in a developed country, a developed or developing country's com-
pany can obtain a patent on it there. But since the drug will not be
patentable in the developing country because it is not "new," nei-
ther company should be able to enforce patent rights in that coun-
try or any other country that views "new" similarly.
Furthermore, if a developed country granted a patent to the
composition that was a purified form of the active ingredient, it
could, by enforcing the patent, prevent others who accept the en-
forceability of that patent from using that composition to make
improvements on it. If, as appears to be acceptable under TRIPS, a
developing country determined that the composition were unpat-
entable because it was not "new," research enterprises could oper-
ate in the developing country to make improvements using the
composition, which, once made, may be patentable in the devel-
oped country and possibly the developing country. Thus, having
the developing country's patent-issuing body implement "new" in
this manner provides a comparative competitive advantage to that
developing county.
How would this affect the patenting of ESTs, complete genes,
homologues, and amino acid sequences? In the instance of ESTs,
the EST sequence is obtained through a mechanical process, which
identifies the underlying gene, homologues, and corresponding
amino acid sequences. Perhaps a developing country will find
that, like the purification of a biochemical activity, the purification
of the DNA or amino acid sequence from an EST does not result in
"new" matter because once the initial reagent is identified, the un-
derlying gene and its homologues are in the possession of the pub-
lic after the application of well-known purification protocols.140
Such a strategy would make a gene identified in this manner un-
available for patent in a country that decided to find such identifi-
cation not "new."
In a developed country allowing protection of the gene, only
the patent holder and those with the patent holder's permission
could use the gene. Compared to such a developed country, a de-
veloping country could have a comparative competitive advantage
if it would not allow protection of the gene, because companies
140 If the initial reagent has no utility other than identifying the underlying




could perform research in the developing country on the gene to
create a practical use for it.
The practical use or utility of using the gene could then be pat-
ented in developed countries and developing countries. The prac-
tical use (or sometimes a likelihood of practical use) is ultimately
what a company needs to make money. More importantly, a prac-
tical use is, in large part, how the public obtains its benefit. At-
tempts to obtain patent protection and exclusionary rights too far
in advance of the conception and reduction to practice of a practi-
cal utility cheat the public of its part of the patent bargain. In the
absence of a practical utility with a commercial value, but with the
prospect of one, there is still incentive for companies to do re-
search. Therefore, the incentive to investigate and identify some
practical utility for the gene is still strong.
The similarity between "new" and "involve an inventive step"
(nonobvious), is such that many of the arguments applicable to us-
ing "new" to raise the bar for patentability, are equally or better
applied to "involve an inventive step."
The elements of patentability required by the TRIPS agreement
can all be subject to modulation by the patent-issuing body of a
developing country. In the case of the biotechnology examples
given above, "new," "involve an inventive step," and "capable of
an industrial application" are all elements of patentability that can
be used to effect a higher bar for patentability in developing coun-
tries.
One thing that is particularly interesting is that the "capable of
an industrial application" (utility) element of patentability, an ele-
ment that is usually not a significant bar to patentability in the
United States, can be reasonably used to reject patents or claims di-
rected to sequences of nucleic acids or proteins. The sequences
themselves often have little utility; they are typically most valuable
as information. They only become valuable beyond being a re-
search tool when applied to practical situations (e.g., gene therapy,
diagnostic tools, transgenic plants, animals, etc.). So a developing
country might, under TRIPS, properly reject a claim to a sequence
as not "capable of an industrial application." After all, it is perhaps
more accurately the use of the sequence in a method or process
that provides the utility, not knowledge of the sequence itself.
And, if the process is only theoretically very reasonable and not
practically possible, then maybe there is not yet a utility.
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5.8. What About Scope?
How TRIPS-implementing countries define infringement can
act to complement whether a country sets a high or low bar for
patentability. For instance, a country affording a very narrow
scope of protection may want to set the bar for patentability low. If
it does, it may issue a lot of patents, but afford each only literal
scope, thus, allowing competitors to make small changes to the
patented device and either get a patent on those small changes or
at least avoid liability for infringement. In this manner, even
though a lot of patents are granted, the scope of protected matter
may be so little as to make the granting of the patent not particu-
larly restrictive to competition. Of course, that could also make the
property right less valuable and could effect a decrease in incentive
to engage and invest in inventive behavior.
Alternatively, a TRIPS-implementing country could set a high
bar for patentability and afford only literal scope. Such an ap-
proach should have even worse economic effects, because not only
will fewer patents be given, but those that are given will not pro-
tect the concept giving rise to the patented subject matter very
well. The result should be a disincentive to engage and invest in
inventive behavior.
A better approach is for a developing country to adopt some
protection for equivalents. Defining and interpreting this ap-
proach will be an important job for a developing country's judici-
ary. By raising the bar for patentability higher than in developed
countries, a developing country obtains the economic benefit of
having a greater amount of subpatentable information. The devel-
opment of a legal doctrine that protects equivalents affords sub-
stantial protection for the patents a developing country does grant.
Thus, developing countries that have a Life Sciences infrastructure
may have the best of both worlds: a pro-competitve environment
relative to developed countries as well as the strong patent policy
necessary for encouraging inventive behavior and investment in
research and development.
6. CONCLUSION
As we pass the seventh anniversary of the TRIPS Agreement
and the one-year anniversary of the deadline for developing coun-
tries to pass into law the international intellectual property stan-
dards promulgated in the TRIPS Agreement, we are really only be-




property standards. Now that developing countries have laws on
the books, the means by which they grant and enforce patents have
to develop within their respective national legal and administrative
infrastructures. Making intelligent decisions on where to set the
bar for patentability is an evolutionary process. After all, it was
not that long ago that a United States Supreme Court dissenting
Justice complained, "the only patent that is valid is one which this
Court has not been able to get its hands on." 141 Depending on
where a country is situated economically, it may be better or worse
to have the bar at a particular level.
There is room within the TRIPS Agreement for developing and
LDCs to make substantive decisions about this subject and still be
viewed as being reasonably within the TRIPS framework. From
that perspective, developed countries may have given up more
than they intended. It will be more difficult now for the U.S. Trade
Representative to argue the moral high ground when she considers
a Section 301 sanction. Under 301, a foreign country had to be vio-
lating United States standards to be the subject of sanctions. Under
TRIPS, in order to be the subject of World Trade Organization
sanctions, a nation must violate TRIPS standards. As this article
has hopefully demonstrated, those standards, while written in the
Agreement in general terms and sounding similar to the standards
used in developed countries, have yet to be digested and inter-
preted by developing countries, LDCs, and the World Trade Or-
ganization DSB. Developing countries can faithfully implement
TRIPS and set the bar for patentability higher than where it exists
in the United States and other developed countries. Developed
countries have now given the DSB the ability to legitimate such ac-
tion.
141 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting).
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